UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24087
11 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I. OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF ARGENTINA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to inform you of the following measures adopted by the Argentine Republic in connection with the implementation of paragraphs 3 to 7 of Security Council resolution 748 (1992) imposing sanctions on the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya:

1. The President of the Argentine nation, by Decree 651 of 21 April 1992, decided as follows:

> Article 1. Resolution 748 (1992) adopted by the United Nations Security Council on 3 March 1992, the text of which is annexed to this Decree, is hereby approved.
>
> Article 2. The Executive Power and the public departments and agencies of the national State, the provinces and the municipalities shall adopt in their respective jurisdictions such measures as may be necessary to give effect to the decisions contained in the resolution approved in the preceding article.
>
> Article 3. This Decree shall be communicated, published and deposited with the National Directorate of the Official Registry and Archives.

2. In the context of the foregoing, the staff of the Embassy of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya has been reduced by two officials, bringing the number of Libyan citizens having diplomatic status accredited to the Republic down to four.

3. Similarly, the movement of Libyan officials is limited to the territory of the Federal capital, and movement within Argentine territory is contingent on the presentation of a note 48 hours in advance.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alfredo V. CHIARADIA
Minister
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

92-24850 3932a 110692 110692

110692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24088
12 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 8 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT MISSION OF QATAR TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations presents its compliments to His Excellency the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to his note verbale of 3 June 1992, has the honour to advise that the State of Qatar does not have with Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) trade relations of any importance or frequency. In particular, the State of Qatar does not export oil or natural gas to Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). Nevertheless, the competent authorities of the State have taken the necessary measures to ban all imports of goods and services from Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and, in general, to fully implement all the provisions of Security Council resolution 757 (1992) in conformity with the State of Qatar's established policy with regard to Security Council resolutions.

92-25044 3416e (E) 120692 120692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24089
12 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

NOTE VERBALE DATED 9 JUNE 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF DJIBOUTI TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

The Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Republic of Djibouti to the United Nations presents its compliments to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, with reference to paragraphs 4 and 9, as well as paragraph 12, of resolution 757 (1992), has the honour to inform him as follows:

Since 30 May 1992, the date of the adoption of resolution 757 (1992), the Government of Djibouti has been performing the obligations incumbent on it under the provisions of the said resolution.

92-25050 3935a (E) 120692 120692

140692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24090
12 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

SPECIAL REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA

1. In my first progress report on the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) of 1 May 1992 (S/23870 and Corr.1 and 2), I stated that UNTAC, under the leadership of my Special Representative, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, had made a generally good start in Cambodia. I referred, inter alia, to the fact that the cease-fire had been restored in Kompong Thom Province, which had been the scene of recent armed clashes, and that the Party of Democratic Kampuchea had begun to remove restrictions on access by UNTAC to areas controlled by it. I added, however, that it was not yet certain whether UNTAC would have the full freedom of movement it required in those areas to reconnoitre all the locations selected for regroupment and cantonment of the forces of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea, the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK).

2. Subsequently, on 9 May, the Commander of the military component of UNTAC, Lieutenant-General John Sanderson, announced that phase II of the cease-fire would begin on 13 June 1992 at 0800 hours. General Sanderson took this step in consultation with the four Cambodian parties and after having obtained from each of them assurances that it would:

(a) Grant freedom of movement to UNTAC personnel, vehicles and aircraft;

(b) Mark minefields in the areas under its control;

(c) Provide to UNTAC by 20 May 1992 information on its troops, arms, ammunition and equipment;

(d) Adhere to the Paris Agreement (S/23177, annex) and in particular:

(i) Not interfere with troops moving to regroupment and cantonment areas;

(ii) Inform its troops of the plan for regroupment and cantonment and the dates and times specified therein.

3. However, in the days following General Sanderson's announcement, it became increasingly clear that the Party of Democratic Kampuchea was not taking the steps necessary to enable it to honour the assurances that it had given. In particular, there was continuing interference with UNTAC's freedom of movement, including obstruction of the deployment of the Netherlands battalion in areas controlled by NADK. At the meeting of the Supreme National Council of Cambodia held on 26 May 1992, my Special Representative again underlined the crucial need for all the Cambodian parties scrupulously to fulfil their obligations as set forth in the Paris Agreements in order to ensure the successful implementation of phase II. He called on the four parties, and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea in particular, to show that they were prepared to enter phase II by taking the following steps:

(a) Permit full and unrestricted freedom of movement to UNTAC in the zones they control;

(b) Refrain from further violations of the cease-fire in Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham and elsewhere;

(c) Mark minefields as required and not to undertake renewed mining;

(d) Stand down from their aggressive postures in Kampot;

(e) Cooperate fully with UNTAC in the reconnaissance of the remaining cantonment sites;

(f) Provide forthwith detailed information on the troops, arms and ammunition to be committed to regroupment and cantonment;

(g) Refrain from including in their radio broadcasts misinformation about UNTAC activities and intentions;

(h) Establish proper commander-to-commander relationships at UNTAC's request;

(i) Inform their forces by using all possible means of communication that phase II will begin at 0800 hours on 13 June and to tell their forces what to do in order to meet the requirements of phase II;

(j) Ensure that all their troops maintain their present positions pending movement to the designated regroupment areas;

(k) Arrange for all their forces, with all their arms, ammunition and equipment, to report to regroupment areas by 27 June, that is, within two weeks from the beginning of phase II;

(l) Then undertake a phased and balanced demobilization of at least 70 per cent of their forces.

Mr. Akashi called on the representatives of the parties to provide at the next meeting of the Supreme National Council on 5 June, if not before, assurances of full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreement relating to phase II of the cease-fire and detailed information on the steps they had taken to implement the 12 points.

4. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea's response to this appeal was not reassuring. In particular, in an incident on 30 May 1992, when my Special Representative, the Force Commander, and other senior UNTAC officials were visiting Pailin in the west of the country, NADK personnel prevented them from proceeding from Pailin to the Thai border. On 3 June, I addressed a personal appeal to H.E. Mr. Khieu Samphan, member of the Supreme National Council, urging that the Party of Democratic Kampuchea take the steps necessary to enable UNTAC to begin implementation of phase II on 13 June. I, of course, informed HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk of this action. A reply from Mr. Khieu Samphan was received on 5 June, which, to my regret, did not contain the requested assurances from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea.

5. At the meeting of the Supreme National Council held on 5 June 1992, my Special Representative once again called on the parties in the strongest terms for full compliance with the provisions of the Paris Agreements and requested them to inform him of the steps they had taken to implement the 12 points. Positive responses were forthcoming from three of the parties, but the Party of Democratic Kampuchea failed to provide the information requested.

6. On 9 June, my Special Representative received a letter from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea stating that it was not in a position to allow UNTAC forces to proceed with their deployments in the areas under its control.

7. At the most recent meeting of the Supreme National Council, on 10 June 1992, my Special Representative reaffirmed the need for the parties to honour the obligations which they had accepted when they signed the Agreements in Paris. He also recalled the importance the international community attached to those Agreements and their full and correct implementation and the significant resources it was contributing to the restoration of peace and stability in Cambodia. He called once more on the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to meet in full its obligations under the Paris Agreements, to comply with the 12 points he had listed at the meeting of the Supreme National Council on 26 May and to enter phase II of the cease-fire on 13 June as agreed. The representative of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea again failed to respond positively.

8. I have taken advantage of the presence of many world leaders at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro to convey to a number of them my deep concern about the problems that have arisen over implementation of phase II and I have sought their help in support of my own efforts to ensure that the timetable will be strictly adhered to by all the Cambodian parties.

9. Implementation of the Paris Agreements has thus reached a critical stage. I find it necessary to draw this to the Security Council's attention so that the Council can consider what action it might appropriately take to ensure that UNTAC receives the cooperation it needs and in particular that the timetable for implementation is adhered to.

10. The vital importance of starting phase II on 13 June as announced cannot be overemphasized. This is crucial in order to ensure that various interrelated processes - cantonment, disarmament and demobilization, repatriation and elections - can proceed within the time-frame envisaged in the implementation plan (S/.3613) and that free and fair elections take place, as scheduled, in April/May 1993. To that end, every possible effort has been made to overcome major logistic difficulties and to deploy the bulk of the military component of UNTAC in Cambodia before 13 June. As of 12 June, over 10,000 troops have arrived in Cambodia, with a further 1,000 scheduled to arrive by 13 June, and more scheduled to arrive by the end of June.

11. However, UNTAC's ability to adhere to the timetable is gravely compromised by lack of cooperation from the Party of Democratic Kampuchea. Two of the other parties have provided, as required and on time, the necessary information on the number of their troops, arms, ammunition and equipment to be cantoned and the third has made a bona fide effort to comply substantially. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea on the other hand has failed to provide this information to UNTAC. NADK has also continued to deny full access and freedom of movement to UNTAC, preventing it from conducting reconnaissance of 6 of the 16 cantonment sites envisaged for NADK. It has also failed to mark minefields in areas under its control and has remined some areas. UNTAC believes NADK to have been responsible for many of the cease-fire violations that have continued to occur in the provinces of Kompong Thom, Kompong Cham and elsewhere.

12. In explanation of its failure to comply with UNTAC's requirements, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea has asserted that foreign military personnel remain present in Cambodia and that, until their withdrawal and non-return has been verified by UNTAC, its own security requires that fulfilment of the above-mentioned obligations must be deferred. While firmly rejecting this view, UNTAC has taken a number of steps designed to help to allay any legitimate security concerns. It has established 10 border checkpoints, one more than envisaged in the implementation plan, on the Cambodia-Viet Nam border at an earlier date than specified in the Agreement. It has invited the representatives of the four parties to participate in manning the checkpoints. On 30 May it launched mobile military teams empowered to carry out investigations of any alleged violations of the provisions of annex 2 to the Paris Agreement, including allegations of the presence of foreign forces, and invited the parties to submit any such allegations to it. On 1 June, the Party of Democratic Kampuchea submitted in writing a list of allegations regarding the presence of foreign forces in Cambodia. In accordance with annex 2, article VI, paragraph 2, of the Paris Agreement, UNTAC requested the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to make personnel available to accompany UNTAC's investigations of these allegations. The Party of Democratic Kampuchea has so far failed to comply with that request.

13. Following the unsatisfactory outcome of the meetings of the Supreme National Council on 5 and 10 June 1992, the question arose of whether 13 June 1992 should be maintained as the date for implementation of phase II of the cease-fire, given that it depends critically on the cooperation of all parties and would not be sustainable for more than a brief period without such cooperation. After careful consideration, I have concluded that phase II of the cease-fire must proceed as scheduled on 13 June. Any significant delay in the implementation of the military aspects of the plan would result in a loss of the momentum that has been carefully built up in recent weeks and would jeopardize UNTAC's ability to organize and conduct the elections by April or May 1993. My Special Representative is accordingly consulting the three parties which have expressed their readiness to begin the regroupment and cantonment of their forces, in order to ensure that this process is conducted in a manner which would minimize any military disadvantage they would suffer vis-à-vis the fourth party.

14. However, this can be only a short-term solution and it is imperative that all efforts should now be made to persuade the Party of Democratic Kampuchea to join the other parties, in good faith, in implementing the comprehensive political settlement to which the international community has committed so much diplomatic effort and such substantial human and material resources. The Security Council may itself wish to consider what action it could take to achieve this objective.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24091
12 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ENGLISH/FRENCH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations among members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3085th meeting, on 12 June 1992, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Cambodia":

"Having read the report of the Secretary-General (S/24090), the Security Council is deeply concerned by the difficulties that the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) is encountering in the implementation of the Paris Agreements, 1/ on the eve of moving to the second phase of the cease-fire. In particular, the Council notes that, during the meeting of the Supreme National Council on 10 June 1992, one party was not able to allow the necessary deployment of UNTAC in areas under its control. The Council believes that any delay could jeopardize the whole peace process to which all Cambodian parties have agreed under the auspices of the United Nations and the Paris Conference.

"The Council reaffirms the importance of the full and timely implementation of the Paris Agreements. The Council commends the efforts of the Secretary-General's Special Representative and UNTAC in this regard. It reaffirms that the Supreme National Council, under the chairmanship of HRH Prince Norodom Sihanouk, is the unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transitional period, the sovereignty, independence and unity of Cambodia are enshrined. In this regard, section III of part I of the Paris Agreements should be implemented as soon as possible.

"The Council stresses the need that the second phase of the military arrangements should begin on 13 June 1992, as determined in accordance with the Agreements. In this connection, the Council urges the Secretary-General to accelerate the deployment of the full UNTAC peace-keeping force to Cambodia and within the country.

"The Council calls upon all parties to comply strictly with the commitments they have accepted, including cooperation with UNTAC. It specifically calls upon all parties to respond affirmatively to the latest demands for cooperation in implementation of the Agreements put to them by UNTAC."

Notes

1/ S/23177, annex.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24092
12 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 10 JUNE 1992 FROM THE CHARGE D'AFFAIRES A.I.
OF THE PERMANENT MISSION OF IRAQ TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

On instruction from my Government, I wish to inform you that violations of Iraqi airspace by United States aircraft for purposes of surveillance and provocation continued during the period from 3 to 9 June 1992, as follows:

3-4 June 1992

Seventeen sorties flown by six two-aircraft formations and five single aircraft at a speed of 720 km/h and at altitudes of 5,500-8,000 m, centred on Zakho, Amadiyah, Ayn Zalah, Dohuk, Irbil, Mosul and Tall Afar.

4-5 June 1992

Twenty-four sorties flown by 11 two-aircraft formations and two single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h at altitudes of 2,000-8,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Amadiyah, Mosul, Tall Afar and Irbil.

5-6 June 1992

Ten sorties flown by five two-aircraft formations at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at an altitude of 4,000 m, centred on Zakho, Dohuk, Irbil, Tall Afar and Mosul.

7 June 1992

At 1543 hours, two aircraft overflew the Bakhirah area at a speed of 720 km/h and at an altitude of 50 m. One of them dropped a flare over agricultural land where wheat was being harvested, but fires did not break out.

7-8 June 1992

Twenty-three sorties flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and one three-aircraft formation at speeds of 700-900 km/h and at an altitude of 5,000 m, centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Zakho, Ayn Zalah, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Rawanduz and Amadiyah.

8-9 June 1992

Twenty-one sorties flown by 10 two-aircraft formations and one single aircraft at speeds of 600-900 km/h and at altitudes of 4,500-6,000 m, except for one sortie that flew at an altitude of 18,000 m. Flights centred on Mosul, Irbil, Dohuk, Tall Afar, Sinjar, Zakho and Amadiyah.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Samir K. K. AL-NIMA
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

A S

UNITED
NATIONS

General Assembly Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

A/47/269
S/24093
12 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-seventh session
Item 69 of the preliminary list*
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-seventh year

Letter dated 11 June 1992 from the Permanent Representative of Czechoslovakia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On behalf of the Chairmanship of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, I have the honour to transmit herewith the document of the Committee of Senior Officials of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, adopted at its 12th meeting, from 8 to 10 June 1992.

I would be most grateful if you could kindly have the texts of the present letter and of the enclosed "Decisions of the Committee of Senior Officials" distributed as a document of the General Assembly, under item 69 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eduard KUKAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/47/50.

92-25095 3211f (E) 130692 140692

/...

Annex

DECISIONS OF THE COMMITTEE OF SENIOR OFFICIALS

1. The CSO met on 8-10 June 1992 to continue its examination of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in other parts of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The participating States focused in particular on the continued deterioration of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and on arrangements for further decisions pertaining to the crisis as required by the statement of the CSO of 12 May 1992.

2. The CSO heard a moving description of the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a call to action by the Foreign Minister of that country, His Excellency Haris Silajdžic. His comments underscored the desperate humanitarian situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and documented the continuing aggression which is destroying the fabric of his nation.

3. This continuing aggression has led to the deepening diplomatic and physical isolation of Serbia and its leaders. United Nations Security Council resolution 757 (1992) is a dramatic example of the determination of the world community not to tolerate the continued disregard by Serbia and the JNA for CSCE commitments and basic human standards. The participating States welcomed the Security Council action as an important concrete ratification of the political message the CSCE has been seeking to impress upon the leaders of Serbia.

4. The participating States expressed their determination to abide fully by the provisions of resolution 757 (1992) and to implement carefully the sanctions which it contains. They recalled also the ongoing process of examination of Belgrade's role in international organizations now under way in the United Nations and agreed to follow closely its implications for the CSCE.

5. The participating States expressed their dismay at the continuing hindrance of humanitarian aid to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina. They called for the immediate facilitation of secure transport to areas of need. In particular, they stressed the importance of establishing a security zone in and around Sarajevo, including its airport, as envisaged in United Nations Security Council resolution 758 (1992), and called for support of the efforts undertaken by the participating States within the United Nations to secure such a zone.

6. They also drew attention to the human and environmental catastrophe which could result from continued shelling of the city of Tuzla, which is home to one of the largest chemical complexes in the Balkans. This plant contains large amounts of toxic and potentially hazardous chemicals. Fire or explosion could result in a serious threat to human health and to the environment.

7. The Committee of Senior Officials also decided on the following specific steps:

(a) In accordance with its decision of 12 May 1992, the CSO will decide on 29 June 1992 further action to be taken, in the light of the information provided by the EC about the situation on the ground and about progress at the EC Peace Conference. To facilitate this decision, the Chairman-in-Office, after consultations with delegations, has invited representatives of Austria, Canada, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, Germany, Greece, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the United States of America to form a task force. This task force will commence its work by 22 June 1992 at the latest and will consider the assessment provided by the EC and the conclusions of the review to be conducted by the United Nations. The task force will present its recommendations for further action to the CSO by 29 June 1992, including those on the question of the participation of the delegation of Yugoslavia in the CSCE, particularly with a view to the arrangements for the forthcoming Helsinki Summit;

(b) The task force will also prepare recommendations, for consideration by the CSO at its meeting on 29 June 1992, on the role that further CSCE missions, of either short or long duration, might play in promoting peace, averting violence and restoring respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sanjak and in support of the efforts of the EC Peace Conference. To help prepare such a recommendation the CSO has decided to send an exploratory mission to the above regions within the next two weeks.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24094
12 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: RUSSIAN

LETTER DATED 12 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I am writing to you with a feeling of deep concern.

The ancient Azerbaijani town of Shusha, which is one of the renowned historic and cultural centres of the Caucasus and has given the world many great thinkers, writers, poets and musicians, is today being subjected to ruinous and irreparable damage by the Armenian armed forces occupying it.

According to my Government's information, many historic and architectural monuments and buildings, museums, mausoleums, mosques, etc. are being destroyed and transformed into ruins.

Such actions cannot be termed other than barbaric and aimed at destroying a unique cultural heritage which combines within itself the spiritual origins and heritage of Asia and Europe. I cannot but note with regret that during the presence in the region of the United Nations fact-finding mission the Armenian side occupying the town did not create conditions enabling it to visit this protected town.

I appeal urgently to you to use all your influence and authority to halt the destruction of this unique town, with its material and spiritual culture which is of irreplaceable value to the world community, and preserve it for future generations, and to bring about the full and immediate withdrawal of the Armenian armed forces occupying Shusha.

I request you to circulate this letter as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador, Permanent Representative
of the Azerbaijani Republic
to the United Nations

120692

92-25082 3134c (E) 120692 120692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24095
12 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: SPANISH

LETTER DATED 11 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF PARAGUAY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note SCPC/1/92(4) of 3 June 1992 regarding resolution 757 (1992), adopted by the Security Council at its 3082nd meeting on 30 May 1992, concerning the situation in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the implementation of Security Council resolution 752 (1992).

I am writing to inform you that the text of resolution 757 (1992) has been transmitted to the competent national institutions for immediate implementation.

(Signed) B. Hugo SAGUIER-CABALLERO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

92-25132 3136c (E) 150692 150692 150692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24096
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Please be informed that the Yugoslav Army has not withdrawn as yet from Bosnia and Herzegovina, 35 days after the expiry of the deadline set by Belgrade. Keeping here around 80,000 soldiers and a huge amount of arms, it continues the aggression against this country, bombing Sarajevo and other towns, destroying civilian objects and killing innocent civilians.

We ask the Security Council, with regard to resolution No. 752, particularly article 4, to pass a new resolution which will provide sanctions and other necessary measures aiming at immediate withdrawal of the Yugoslav Army from the territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

We take this opportunity to reaffirm our willingness to assist and cooperate on implementation of Security Council resolution No. 758.

We would be grateful if this letter could be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Alija IZETBEGOVIC

92-25332 3137c (E) 150692 150692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24097
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 9 JUNE 1992 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to refer to the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM).

Major General Günther G. Greindl (Austria), who has been Chief Military Observer of UNIKOM since its establishment in April 1991, will relinquish his command on 10 July 1992 to return to his country's national service. Following the usual consultations, I propose to appoint Major General Timothy K. Dibuama (Ghana), who currently serves as my Military Adviser, to assume the post of Chief Military Observer of UNIKOM with effect from 12 July 1992.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI

92-25368 3226i (E) 160692 160692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24098
15 June 1992
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: FRENCH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1992 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 9 June 1992 (S/24097) concerning the appointment of Major-General Timothy K. Dibuama as the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) with effect from 12 July 1992 has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They agree with the proposal contained in your letter.

(Signed) Paul NOTERDAEME

92-25380 3940a (E) 160692 160692 160692

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24099
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 15 JUNE 1992 FROM THE FOREIGN MINISTER OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

On behalf of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I thank the United Nations Security Council for passage of resolution 757 (1992) which resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. Subsequently, resolution 758 (1992) was adopted, addressing urgent humanitarian concerns.

Tragically, these actions by the United Nations have not yet stemmed the aggression or allowed for the delivery of desperately needed humanitarian assistance. The aggression by the Serbian regime, whose very legitimacy is being questioned by Member States of this body, continues unabated and with increasing ferocity.

As I write, Sarajevo is encircled by a ring of death. Western military intelligence sources confirm 50 to 100 pieces of heavy artillery, including 105 mm and 155 mm howitzers and 122 mm multiple-rocket launchers, along with 100 to 200 lighter mortars, firing from the hills into the city.

SA-6 and shoulder-fired SA-7 surface-to-air missiles and dozens of 20 mm and 30 mm anti-aircraft guns in the hands of the Serb extremists nearby the airport are being used daily against innocent civilians in this reign of terror. Some 80,000 federal army troops and Serb extremists are brutalizing our country.

Air attacks by Yugoslav MiG fighter jets prove the Belgrade regime's continued direct involvement, despite their statements to the contrary. Such duplicity follows their strategy of deception.

The unending slaughter by attacks, starvation and dehydration is occurring not only in Sarajevo, but in Mostar, Tuzla, Gorazde, Prijedor, Bihac, Foca, Zvornik, Bijelina and other cities.

Millions of television viewers around the world have watched with horror as these instruments of death pound our people. They feel disgust and anger at the abhorrent acts of brutality and callous disregard for human life.

Because of this "man-made hell" imposed on our people by the Belgrade regime, my Government requests the United Nations to invoke Article 42 of Chapter VII, which calls for coordinated military action by air, sea or land to restore international peace and security. Article 42 may be enacted when means provided in Article 41 prove to be inadequate. Regrettably, there is no other option.

Specifically, the Sarajevo airport must be secured, relief supply lines with escorted convoys must be opened, artillery and anti-aircraft weapons must be neutralized, military supply lines must be interdicted and the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina must be closed to military sorties. Through targeted air power, these objectives can be accomplished.

This is neither a civil war nor an ethnic conflict. Serbs, Croats and Muslims are fighting shoulder-to-shoulder to defend their country, just as they have been living together in peace for centuries until this senseless aggression.

Because of recent questions, it should be noted that Croatian-Bosnians are fighting within a unified force of Bosnia-Herzegovina under one command and are carrying out military tasks set by the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. These courageous troops are fighting for the freedom and independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the defence forces of our country.

Since all other means have been exhausted, and since the aggression shows no signs of abating, action is demanded from this great body.

If this action is not taken now, hundreds of thousands will be condemned to death from attack and starvation, and the fundamental principles to which we have all committed will be rendered meaningless.

I would be grateful if you would have this letter circulated immediately as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dr. Haris SILAJDZIC
Foreign Minister

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24100
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 757 (1992) AND PARAGRAPH 10 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 758 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 15 of resolution 757 (1992) the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it "on the implementation of resolution 752 (1992) by all parties and others concerned". In paragraph 10 of resolution 758 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on his efforts to reopen Sarajevo airport in order to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies. The present report is submitted in fulfilment of the above requests of the Council, and supplements the Secretary-General's earlier reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 752 (1992) (S/24000), and pursuant to paragraph 4 of the same resolution (S/24049). It contains information available to the Secretariat up to 0900 hours New York time on 15 June 1992.

I. POINTS ARISING FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 752 (1992)

A. The cease-fire of 12 April 1992

2. In paragraph 1 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately [and] respect immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992".

3. This request of the Council was not at first heeded by the parties to the conflict. Numerous and repeated violations of the cease-fire continued to take place. Since the cease-fire of 12 April referred to in resolution 752 (1992), a new cease-fire was negotiated by the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) on 1 June, though this was itself violated within hours of its signing. It was subsequently reaffirmed in the agreement concluded in respect of Sarajevo airport on 5 June (S/24075, annex). That agreement, too, was not respected for several days. Indeed, as a result of the evacuation by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) of the Marshal Tito

barracks in Sarajevo, whose blockading was described in S/24049, paragraph 6 (b), the Territorial Defence force of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reported to have acquired artillery, which it used to try to extend the territory under its control. The Bosnian Serb forces continued to use their own artillery to bombard the city of Sarajevo, which as a result suffered even more severe damage. On 11 June, one of the signatories to the airport agreement, Mr. Radovan Karadzic of the Bosnian Serb SDS party, announced a further "unilateral cease-fire" effective 15 June. In a letter to me on 13 June, President Izetbegovic denounced this as "an attempt to deceive the United Nations and world opinion". None the less, on 14 June both sides reaffirmed a new cease-fire as from 0600 hours local time on 15 June (see para. 30 below), which appears, at the time of writing, to be generally holding.

B. Efforts of the European Community

4. Also in paragraph 1 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned ... cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about urgently a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change of border by force is not acceptable". In paragraph 2, the Council urged "the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively and constructively" in the European Community-sponsored discussions and "to conclude and implement the constitutional arrangements being developed at the tripartite talks".

5. The most recent session of the European Community-sponsored talks for future constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina was suspended on 27 May when representatives of the Muslim SDA Party withdrew from the talks in protest against the continuing shelling of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces. Subsequent statements by the leaders of that party have reiterated their unwillingness to return to the negotiating table. On 8 June, President Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote to Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, "to refuse the proposal to continue the talks in the present form" and expressed his inability to undertake further negotiations with representatives of the Serbian SDS Party. In reply, Lord Carrington urged him to participate fully in the negotiations and expressed the hope that President Izetbegovic would attend the next round of these discussions, which would be convened in the near future. Members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina have, in conversations with UNPROFOR representatives, reaffirmed their view that they could resume participation in these talks only if the basis for discussions was changed. The leader of the Serbian SDS Party, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, has confirmed his party's willingness to participate in the talks and urged that they be reconvened immediately.

6. In my contacts with Lord Carrington, I have assured him of my continued support for his efforts towards an overall political settlement and of my conviction that the continuation and strengthening of the political process is a sine qua non for finding a way out of this tragic impasse and for arresting further bloodshed and destruction. I have noted that the impetus towards a

political settlement must be strengthened in order to prevent the conflict spreading in the region and making future reconciliation difficult for generations to come. In a statement on 12 June, Lord Carrington reiterated his intention to resume the talks on future constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and said that he and Ambassador Cutileiro would proceed to Sarajevo for this purpose as soon as the airport is reopened.

C. External military interference

7. In paragraph 3 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council demanded that "all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end such interference". In paragraph 4, the Council demanded that units of the JNA and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina "must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring". In paragraph 5, the Council also demanded that "all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and disarmed".

8. I have reported fully on this subject in document S/24049. I regret to inform the Council that in the two weeks since that report was issued, there has been no appreciable change in the situation described therein. The authorities in both Belgrade and Zagreb categorically insist that they do not interfere militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They further insist that armed Serbs and Croats there are citizens of that Republic who may have been members of the JNA and Croatian Army respectively but who are now demobilized from those armies and in no sense under the authority or control of Belgrade or Zagreb, as the case may be. At a meeting with me in Rio de Janeiro on 12 June, the Prime Minister of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Greguric, reaffirmed that Croatian Army units were deployed only on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not on Bosnian territory and recalled a statement by President Izetbegovic to the effect that Croatian units in Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting as part of, and under the command of, the Territorial Defence forces of that Republic.

9. It none the less remains a matter of great concern that demobilized elements of the armies of both sides should have been permitted to retain control over their tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, personal weapons and uniforms. There is also reason to believe that both Serb and Croat combatants continue to receive at least part of their financial and logistic support from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 June, UNPROFOR confirmed that an air attack involving cluster bombs was made on a hill outside Sarajevo controlled by forces of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

D. Expulsions

10. In paragraph 6 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council called upon "all parties and others concerned to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population, anywhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cease immediately".

11. The practice of forced expulsions has continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The grim situation described in my earlier reports, particularly S/23900, paragraphs 5 and 6, persists.

12. Elsewhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mass expulsions have also continued to occur. Following UNPROFOR's assumption of responsibility in Sector East, groups of Ruthenians and Croats were expelled from the villages of Miklusevci and Tovarnik on 19 and 23/24 May 1992. The second expulsion was intercepted by UNPROFOR, but the victims, who had been thoroughly intimidated, refused to go back to their villages and preferred to cross into Croatian-held territory. UNPROFOR has made representations, both written and oral, to the local authorities in Sector East as well as to the authorities in Belgrade and has submitted to both of them prosecution dossiers based on UNPROFOR's detailed investigation. UNPROFOR has called for the prosecution of 11 named individuals, including policemen, against whom a prima facie case has been established. The authorities concerned have given assurances that the prosecutions will be actively pursued. Following this episode, mass expulsions from Sector East appear to have ceased. But UNPROFOR has intensified its patrols in certain locations of special sensitivity, using police, military and civilian affairs personnel, and responds vigorously to any cases of intimidation that come to its attention.

13. A similar situation prevails in the Croatian-controlled parts of Sector West, where members of the Serbian minority are harassed by Croatian individuals and groups. Serbian houses continue to be burned and/or blown up in this Sector, in which UNPROFOR is yet to assume its full responsibilities. Evidence collected by United Nations civilian police has, in some instances, implicated the Croatian Army and police. UNPROFOR has protested to the authorities in Zagreb about the persistent violations of human rights in that part of Sector West which is under their control.

14. Both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia minority families driven from their homes and farms are replaced, sometimes apparently with official assistance, by persons of other ethnic groups displaced from other regions. The purpose is to create areas overwhelmingly populated by a single ethnic group, a practice that has come to be known as "ethnic cleansing". UNPROFOR is doing all it can, within the limits of its mandate and resources, to prevent these inhumane practices and to respond vigorously when they occur. But what is required is energetic official action to end the excesses which are being carried out by ethnic chauvinists of all communities. Meanwhile, the implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 752 (1992) remains elusive.

E. Humanitarian assistance

15. In paragraph 7 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council emphasized the urgent need for humanitarian assistance and fully supported efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict. In paragraph 8, it called on "all parties and others concerned to ensure that conditions are established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina". In paragraph 9, the Council requested the Secretary-General "to keep under active review the feasibility of protecting international humanitarian relief programmes".

16. Since June 1991, some 1.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the numbers continue to rise. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 750,000 people have been displaced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of whom have crossed into neighbouring republics which are already offering refuge to more than 500,000 persons displaced from the war in Croatia. None of the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been unaffected by the humanitarian crisis. The number of victims of the conflict continues to grow while the ability of the host communities to look after them steadily declines.

17. As I made clear in my report in S/24000, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to an increasingly deprived population in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been gravely complicated by the persistence of fighting. On 24 May UNHCR was compelled to suspend deliveries of humanitarian relief supplies within Bosnia and Herzegovina after it became clear that security guarantees negotiated with political and military leaders were not respected by local gunmen manning a profusion of roadblocks. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in turn, suspended its relief operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the killing of one of its delegates on 18 May 1992. Negotiations to achieve more adequate security guarantees were continued with all parties to the conflict and culminated in a new agreement signed under the auspices of ICRC in Geneva on 6 June. Following this agreement, ICRC and UNHCR have indicated their intention to resume operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina shortly.

18. The question of the reopening of Sarajevo airport to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies is treated in paragraphs 27 to 31 below.

F. Possible peace-keeping mission

19. In paragraph 10 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council asked the Secretary-General "to continue to keep under review the possibility of deploying a peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

20. In the light of the evolving situation and given that UNPROFOR had become the only international entity still present in Sarajevo, I recommended to the

Security Council in my last report (S/24075) the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and an increase in its strength to facilitate the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian and related purposes. The Council approved this recommendation in its resolution 758 (1992). A progress report on the first phase of this mission is provided in paragraphs 27 to 31 below.

G. Cooperation with UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitor Mission

21. In paragraph 11 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitor Mission, and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel". I regret to report that the response to this demand has been extremely limited.

22. The European Community Monitor Mission withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 May following the killing of one of its monitors. UNPROFOR temporarily withdrew the bulk of its headquarters personnel from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, while leaving behind a headquarters group of 106 persons headed by the Chief Military Observer, Colonel John Wilson. Their tasks are described in S/24000, paragraph 10. The work of Colonel Wilson and his team has been considerably handicapped by repeated interference with its freedom of movement, including many incidents in which UNPROFOR vehicles were fired upon. In fact, all UNPROFOR movement in Sarajevo now has to take place in armoured personnel carriers. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR estimates that he has been fortunate not to have suffered casualties, given all parties' disregard for the safety of UNPROFOR personnel. Agreements arrived at after intensive liaison with the parties, guaranteeing safe passage to UNPROFOR vehicles on specific routes at agreed times, have routinely been violated. Such violations are invariably ascribed by each party to the other side or to persons unknown.

H. UNPROFOR in the United Nations Protected Areas

23. In paragraph 12 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to ensure that UNPROFOR will assume its full responsibilities in all the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) as soon as possible", following its assumption of responsibility in Sector East on 15 May.

24. Although some progress is being made to this end, difficulties persist. In Sector East, Territorial Defence units refuse to withdraw heavy equipment, including tanks and mortars, from the UNPA; efforts continue in order to remove these obstacles, as also to commence the demilitarization process in this sector. In Sector West, some delay in UNPROFOR's assumption of responsibility has occurred as a result of difficulties relating to the exact definition of the boundaries and the necessity for readjustment of battalion responsibilities to release one battalion for possible tasks at Sarajevo airport. In Sectors North and South, problems continue in relation to the

so-called "pink zones". These are largely Serb-populated areas between the proposed UNPA boundaries and the present lines of confrontation, whose inhabitants are unwilling to accept the restoration of Croatian activity and want to be incorporated within the UNPAs. The Force Commander reports that efforts continue to be made on these issues and that it is his hope that UNPROFOR will have assumed its full responsibilities in all the UNPAs by the end of June.

25. UNPROFOR difficulties in Sectors North and South have recently been exacerbated by developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their economic situation is deteriorating rapidly because of blockades and the closing of established lines of supply from Serbia through the northern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the fighting in that Republic. Shortages of power, food and medical supplies are now widespread. In addition, the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina creates tension in the UNPAs and sometimes spills over into them. Moreover, refugees from that fighting have imposed additional demands upon already scarce resources in these sectors.

I. Disarming of irregulars

26. In paragraph 13 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council urged full compliance with the United Nations peace- keeping plan, "in particular the disarming of all irregular forces ... in the UNPAs". Progress in this matter has been slow. Many of the irregular forces appear to have been absorbed into the local territorial defence militias, and in some cases the local police, in the UNPAs. The whole problem of the disarming and demobilisation of the irregular and territorial forces has been complicated by the decision of the JNA to deliver much of its weapons, including heavy weapons, to those forces before withdrawing from the UNPAs. Talks on these issues are proceeding in Sector East, where UNPROFOR has assumed responsibility; little progress has been made so far in the other sectors.

II. REOPENING OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT

27. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 758 (1992) on 8 June 1992, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, General Nambiar, decided to dispatch on 10 June his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Lewis MacKenzie, to Sarajevo as Commander-designate of UNPROFOR's new Sarajevo sector. General MacKenzie was accompanied by an advance party including some United Nations military observers and reconnaissance elements drawn from the Canadian infantry battalion, which is currently deployed in Sector West and which the Force Commander intends in due course to transfer temporarily to Sarajevo pending the arrival in theatre of the additional infantry elements approved by Security Council resolution 758 (1992).

28. General MacKenzie set out in a convoy from Belgrade early on 11 June and reached the former JNA base at Lukavica, outside Sarajevo, without incident. However, two UNPROFOR escort vehicles from Sarajevo that went out to meet him

and bring him to UNPROFOR headquarters were turned back by small arms fire as well as mines and barriers laid across the road. The two UNPROFOR vehicles were struck by several dozen rounds and a soldier was slightly injured. General MacKenzie was therefore obliged to remain at Lukavica overnight and arrived at UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo only at 1600 hours on 11 June, 34 hours after his convoy had set out. His attempts the following day to return to Lukavica for discussions with General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, were similarly thwarted.

29. General MacKenzie was joined on 12 June by an airport security team of 50 persons, including 10 officers, provided by the Government of France. A further 60 military observers drawn equally from two existing peace-keeping operations, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), are being moved to Sarajevo on 16 June. The task of General MacKenzie's advance party is to establish the cease-fire, start evaluating conditions at the airport and verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft and heavy weaponry as provided for in the agreement of 5 June (S/24075, annex). For the first three days of their mission, it proved impossible for them to reach Sarajevo airport. This was partly because of widespread fighting in the areas they had to cross en route to the airport but also because they came under fire from Bosnian Serb elements who appeared not to accept the agreement of 5 June and were seemingly not prepared to allow the airport to be placed under United Nations control.

30. On 14 June, however, General MacKenzie was able to achieve three of his immediate objectives. First, he obtained separate reaffirmations of the cease-fire from representatives of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as of the Bosnian Serb side; the resulting cease-fire came into effect at 0600 hours local time on 15 June, and at least initially appears to be holding. Secondly, with the cooperation of the Bosnian Serb side and under their escort, he was able to despatch a 30-man reconnaissance team to the airport; details of their findings appear in paragraph 31 below. Thirdly, he made significant progress in discussions on the withdrawal of heavy weapons from within range of Sarajevo airport. A definitive agreement on this question with military leaders on the Bosnian Serb side was expected to be signed shortly. Although these developments are encouraging, difficulties persist in relation to safe access from UNPROFOR headquarters to the airport, the preferred route being one that traverses a heavily contested area, control of which has frequently changed hands in the course of the recent conflict. The establishment of an effective and lasting cease-fire is clearly required for the resolution of this problem.

31. With regard to the initial reconnaissance of the airport on 14 June, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR reports that the installations appear to be in better condition than had been feared. In particular, the buildings do not appear to have suffered extensive damage and the runways, taxiways and parking aprons appear on first sight to be in usable condition. The lack of electricity at the airport made it impossible to verify if the equipment in the control tower and its approach beacons are functioning. Some of the airport's heavy equipment has been damaged and there are no fire trucks or fuel tankers; in any event, the Force Commander recommends that, as a

practical matter, aircraft flying into Sarajevo not attempt to refuel there. Despite this encouraging report, it is clear that considerable work still needs to be done to get the airport functioning again.

III. OBSERVATIONS

32. It will be apparent from the preceding paragraphs that there is only limited progress to report as regards implementation of the international community's efforts to control and resolve the dreadful conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I nevertheless believe that the international community should remain firm in its determination to put into effect the mechanisms and procedures which it has already established to relieve the human suffering, to bring the fighting under control and to negotiate a just and lasting political settlement of the conflict. What is lacking at present is willingness on the part of the opposing sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to honour agreements which they sign and to use the mechanisms which the international community has put into place at great cost and risk to the lives of international personnel. Although the developments of 14 and 15 June offer encouragement in this respect, I am keenly aware of how often in the past similar hopes have been dashed.

33. The picture in Croatia is less sombre as UNPROFOR moves towards assumption of its full responsibilities in all four sectors of the UNPAs, though daily breaches of the cease-fire and violations of human rights still occur there, as well as instances of non-cooperation with UNPROFOR. But, in assessing the prospects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to remember that there was a time when the situation in Croatia also seemed hopeless. Yet the international community's perseverance in peacemaking and peace-keeping did in the end bring about conditions which, though far from perfect, have permitted the deployment of a large United Nations peace-keeping force.

34. For its part, the United Nations will continue to do all it can to implement both UNPROFOR's original mandate in Croatia and the new one entrusted to it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These efforts by the United Nations are intended to create the conditions in which effective international action can be taken to ease the suffering of the civilian population and in which the negotiation of political solutions can proceed under the auspices of the European Community. It is political negotiation which offers the only real hope of restoring peace in what were the constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I therefore join my voice to Lord Carrington's in appealing to all concerned to return to the negotiating tables over which he and Ambassador Cutileiro preside. The Security Council may again wish to reaffirm its unqualified support for their efforts.

35. I also urge the international community to respond generously to the appeals for humanitarian support made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to respond to the problems of all refugees and displaced persons from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, wherever they may be and to whichever community they may belong.

UNITED
NATIONS

S

Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24100/Corr.1
16 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 757 (1992) AND PARAGRAPH 10 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 758 (1992)

Corrigendum

Page 7, paragraph 24

The second sentence should read as follows:

These are largely Serb-populated areas between the proposed UNPA boundaries and the present lines of confrontation, whose inhabitants are unwilling to accept the restoration of Croatian authority and want to be incorporated within the UNPAs.

92-25504 3423e (E) 160692

160692